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1. Introduction   
Foodgrains are vitally important to food security. In 2004-05, an average Indian 
household spent 36% of its total expenditure on foodgrains, down from about 50% in 1983. 
The poor spent an even higher percentage, and derive much of their nutrition (more than 
three-quarters) from foodgrains. On production side, foodgrains occupy about 66% of the 
gross cropped area in the country, although they contribute only 36% of the gross value of 
crop output (TE 2003-04). How the grain economy is managed, therefore, is critical not only 
for poor consumers but also for large number of producers. 
This paper examines the current system of public foodgrain management in its entirety – 
from price support and procurement operations to public distribution through fair price shops, 
and buffer stocking for national food security. It re-visits the rationale of each one of these 
inter-related components and analyses how far the objectives are being met and at what cost. 
Thereafter, it suggests an agenda for reforming the foodgrain management system in India 
which is much more cost effective and also well targeted to achieve the objectives of food 
security than the existing system. 
2.  The Context for Alarm 
M.S. Swaminathan, Chairman of the National Commission on Farmers, says “The 
farming sector is fast heading for a total collapse if no rapid remedial measures are taken.” 
[India Today 2007]. The fifth and final report of the National Commission on Farmers 
recommended a massive approach to revitalize agricultural progress by making agrarian 
prosperity and food security and sovereignty the bottom line for government policies and 
priorities in agriculture [MOA 2006]. The report of the Steering Committee on Agriculture 
and Allied Sciences for Formulation of the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012), chaired by 
C. H. Hanumantha Rao, noted that public and private investment in infrastructure, including 
irrigation, technological change, diversification and fertilizer, the four major sources of 
agricultural growth in India, had slowed down since the 1990s and recommended stepping up 
public investments in agriculture to four percent of Agricultural GDP, implying that public 
investments, at 1999-2000 prices, would be raised annually by 12 percent during the 11
th Plan 
[Planning Commission 2007]. The Prime Minister stated in his inaugural speed to the 
National Development Council on May 29, 2007: “The rates of growth in agriculture in the 
last decade have been poor and are a major cause of rural distress. Farming is largely 
becoming an unviable activity.” A National Food Security Mission was launched and a mega   4
Rs.25,000 crore assistance program to reinvigorate agricultural productivity to four percent 
annually was announced. 
The establishment of the National Food Security Mission signals a major concern for 
foodgrains. The compound annual growth rate of foodgrain production has been just 1.2% 
during 2000-06, which is below the rate of growth of population [MOA 2006]. The net per 
capita availability of foodgrains in the country has fallen from 175 kgs per annum during TE 
1993 to 161 Kgs. during TE 2005. During 2006, India imported wheat to the tune of about 5 
million tons. All of these factors together seem to have pressed the alarm bells for the 
government to re-instate the high priority to foodgrains in its strategy to rejuvenate 
agriculture.
2 Much of the emphasis in government approach to boost foodgrain sector is 
supply-driven, i.e., trying to remove supply bottlenecks to augment production. No serious 
attempt is being made to reform the foodgrain management system. Our contention is that 
this is equally important, if not more, to achieve food security in a cost effective manner. 
Thus, we raise serious questions about whether the present food management system – which 
has basically persisted for forty years with only minor changes in the context of a radically 
changing agriculture and total economy – has not out-lived its usefulness.  
3.  Foodgrains Management in India 
The existing system of foodgrains management – with its origins in the unprecedented 
consecutive severe droughts in 1965-66 and 1966-67 necessitating massive emergency food 
aid imports and the subsequent need to disseminate high-yielding varieties – is characterized 
by the dominant presence of the government in all the basic aspects of marketing, viz., 
procurement, storage and distribution, with all these operations being bundled and carried out 
by the Food Corporation of India (FCI), the nodal parastatal agency. 
The FCI procures foodgrains in the form of wheat or paddy directly from farmers and in 
the form of rice from rice millers. The procurement/levy price is recommended by the 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) based on considerations of cost of 
production and includes a “fair” return to land and family labour of the farmers. It is 
essentially a system of open-ended procurement under which the FCI is obligated to buy all 
the grains that farmers offer to sell at the prescribed procurement price as long as the grains 
meet a certain quality standard. Where it operates, this open-ended procurement system 
effectively renders the procurement price to be a support price below which the prices do not 
fall. With regard to rice, the millers are obligated to sell a certain fraction of their produce to 
the FCI at the levy price, which makes it essentially a “tax” on millers. The operation of the 
                                                 
2  Although it is true that growth in foodgrains has slowed down, one can argue that there is no need to panic on this front. 
With rising incomes people switch their consumption from foodgrains to high value agriculture products such as fruits and 
vegetables, milk and dairy products, meat and fish (Engel’s law). The per capita consumption of cereals has fallen from 
more than 14 kgs. per month in 1983 to 11.5 kgs. in 2004-05. (NSSO, various years). Also, while India was importing 
more than 5 million tons of wheat, one should not forget that India exported more than 4 million tons of rice of higher 
value than imports of wheat during 2006-07. The net per capita availability of foodgrains has fluctuated from 164 kgs. per 
annum during the TE 1983 to 175 Kgs during TE 1993 to 161 kgs during TE 2005.    5
FCI is aided by a whole paraphernalia of self-serving legislations, rules and guidelines, most 
important amongst which are the monopoly control over international trade in foodgrains, 
and internal movement and storage restrictions on private traders (Table 1). The former 
insulate the government from movements in world prices and allow it to pursue a domestic 
price policy of its own. The latter, by discouraging other options to farmers, enables the FCI 
to procure grains from the surplus states. 
The degree of market intervention – public procurement as percentage of total production 
– has increased significantly over the past forty years (Table 2). Market intervention is more 
pronounced in the surplus states, in practice largely confined to Punjab, Haryana, western 
Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. And the intervention is largely confined to wheat and 
rice.  
The grains procured by the FCI are used to maintain a buffer stock and to meet the needs 
of the public distribution system (PDS) and various other welfare programmes that the 
government runs. The FCI is responsible for storing, transporting and distributing the grains 
through the PDS. 
The PDS involves a network of over 485 thousand fair price shops (FPS) through which 
grains (and a few other commodities) are sold at a subsidized price. Foodgrains for the PDS 
(and other food based social safety nets (SSNs)) come primarily from the FCI. Thus, the PDS 
also serves as an outlet for offloading the food stock that government procures under its price 
support programs. Given these close links between the PDS and the price support, 
procurement and storage policies, any market liberalization that changes the current 
procurement-stocking-distribution paradigm will have implications for the functioning of the 
PDS and other food-based SSNs. If the restrictions on market are withdrawn and floor prices 
are adjusted, the government may not be able to procure the food stock necessary to run the 
PDS and other food based SSNs. In fact, this fear of possible disruptions to the functioning of 
the PDS is often used as an argument to stifle reforms in the government’s foodgrains 
policies.  
4.  Does the Current System Ensure Food Security to the Poor?  
4.1.  Evaluating Price Support  
One of the stated objectives of the public intervention in grain management is to ensure a 
reasonable support price which will induce the farmer to adopt improved methods of 
cultivation for increasing production. Figures 1 and 2 show the MSP compared to A2 (paid 
out) and C2 (full costs including returns to labour, land, and management) costs. The MSP is 
much higher than A2 costs for both wheat and rice in all states which means that the concept 
of risk-coverage, which was the original justification for support prices, seems to be a relic of 
the very distant past. Even more significantly, the MSP was above C2 costs for wheat for 
almost all production and for rice for over two-thirds of production. That is, the MSP is now 
really an income-transfer mechanism.    6
There is now growing evidence that MSP may not be as effective in inducing production 
as it was in the past. Forty years after the onset of The Green Revolution almost all of the 
high potential land is already sown to high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice. A review of 
the literature on supply response for rice and wheat in India suggest that, by and large, output 
responds less than proportionately to changes in output prices.3 These studies also show that 
price incentives have much less impact on output than investments (public and/or private) in 
technology, which undermines the rationale for government’s price intervention policies in 
the grain markets as an instrument for inducing production of these two cereals. These 
studies, however, mask various other important negative side-effects that the public 
intervention in grain markets has at the ground level. Farmers, being assured of a certain 
minimum price that guarantees a minimum return, would not be compelled to use inputs such 
as water, fertilizer, etc., efficiently which will have adverse impact on the natural 
environment. Besides, they can also be major disincentives for farmers to diversify into other 
crops, and for private traders from participating in grain markets. The experience of public 
procurement in the surplus states of Punjab and Andhra Pradesh amply bring out many of 
these negative effects in great detail.  
4.2.  Evaluating Buffer Stocks 
The inadequacy of the existing food policy regime is reflected in the wild swings in the 
foodgrains stock (Figure 3). The mid-1990s witnessed partial liberalization of the foodgrains 
trade policies, first in rice followed by wheat. The consequent spurt in exports was 
remarkable. Exports of rice shot up from about a million tons to almost 5 million tons, 
making India the second largest exporter in 1995-96. Next year, wheat exports started 
increasing. This resulted in increase in domestic prices of wheat. Concerned with rising 
prices of wheat, government put a ban on exports of wheat and opened imports at zero import 
duty. Not much wheat imports could come in as world prices were high, but the world price 
of cereals took a dramatic downturn from 1998 in the wake of East Asian crisis. However, at 
the domestic level, the MSP offered by the government kept rising. As a result, exports 
became uncompetitive while sales to the government became lucrative and, given the open-
ended public procurement policy, this led to significant increase in public procurement. Faced 
with mounting fiscal deficit due in part to rising food subsidies, the government increased the 
ration prices resulting in a fall in demand from FPS. This combination of increasing 
procurement and declining public distribution resulted in an unprecedented accumulation of 
public foodgrains stock that reached as high as 63 million metric tons by July 2002, 
equivalent to about 50 percent of total world trade volume in a given year. In the subsequent 
years (till 2004), the government subsidized exports (by waiving off a part of the freight and 
stocking costs) at a price that was 50 percent lower than the government’s procurement costs. 
As a result, stocks plummeted to just 16 million tons by April 2007. The case of wheat is 
                                                 
3  Krishna and Chibber (1983), Jha and Srinivasan (1999), Srinivasan and Jha (2001), Rashid et al. (2005), Mythili (2006). 
See Gulati and Kelly (1999) for a review of the estimates of price elasticities.    7
particularly sharp, from about 41 million tons in July 2002 to just 2 million tons in April 
2007.  
4.3.  Evaluating the Public Distribution System  
The PDS was universal up to 1997, when it was converted into the Targeted Public 
Distribution System (TPDS) under which a distinction was made between the people below 
and above poverty line for better targeting of food subsidies. A macro level assessment of the 
performance of the PDS/TPDS based on the data on allocation and offtake of grains across 
states over the period 1993-94 to 2005-06 suggest the following:  
Firstly, the correlation between poverty shares and grain allocation shares across states 
was only 0.36 in 1993-94 when the PDS was universal. Under TPDS, the correlation between 
allocations to population Below Poverty Line (BPL) and poverty concentrations across states 
has risen dramatically to 0.94 in 1999-00 and 0.98 in 2005-06. Thus, there has been a major 
correction in the way grains are allocated to different states with allocation now being in line 
with poverty concentrations.  
Secondly, offtake of grains by states in 1993-94 was low (below 80%) in most states 
except Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Strikingly, offtake was below 50% of the allocation 
in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, each of which had 
large concentrations of poor in the country. The shift to TPDS has seen an improvement in 
offtake in most states, especially for the BPL population. By 2005-06, almost all states (Bihar 
is the exception) including the ones with large poverty concentrations had very high offtake 
percentages (exceeding 75%) for the BPL population. Thus, on this aspect too, there is a 
definite improvement in the situation for BPL following the move from universal PDS to 
TPDS.  
While there has been a correction in the allocation of grains across states, allocation 
amongst BPL and APL continues to be loaded in favour of the latter. In 2005-06, 62 percent 
of grains were allocated to the APL in the country as a whole. Only two states, Jammu & 
Kashmir and Kerala, have seen reductions in the allotment of grains to the population Above 
Poverty Line (APL) under the TPDS, both in absolute and in percentage terms. In all other 
states and in the country as a whole, the allotment to APL population has increased in 
absolute terms, and in several states in percentage terms as well. Notable amongst these are 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, which together account 
for 61% of the poor in the country in 1999-00.  
Has this limited improvement under the TPDS resulted in higher incomes / greater 
welfare for the poor? To answer this question one needs to examine micro level data for 
households. Radhakrishna et al. (1997) studied the dependence on PDS by the poor, income 
gains from PDS and poverty reducing impacts of PDS using National Sample Survey (NSS) 
data for 1986-87. Dev et al. (2004) carry out a similar exercise using NSS data for 1993-94 
and 1999-00. The following conclusions emerge from these two studies:    8
Firstly, dependence on PDS (share of PDS purchase in total grain consumption) by the 
poor is low but seems to have increased between 1986-87 and 1999-00 at the all-India level 
and across majority of the states. At the all-India level, the share of PDS grain in total grain 
consumption has increased from 6.8 percent to 8.8 percent for the rural poor and from 13.64 
percent to 16.66 percent for the urban poor. For the non-poor, the PDS dependence has 
increased in the rural areas, but declined among urban households.  
Secondly, income gains through PDS show significant increase for both rural and urban 
poor following the introduction of the TPDS in 1997 but continues to be small. In 1999-00, 
income gains at All-India level accounted for about 2 percent of total per capita expenditure 
of rural poor, twice its share in 1986-87 when PDS was universal. The gains in the poorer 
states seem to show a significant increase over the years. The correlation between state-wise 
poverty shares and income gains was close to zero (just 0.01) in 1986-87, and in fact turned 
marginally negative (-0.07) suggesting that the situation had turned somewhat regressive by 
1993-94 when universal PDS was still in operation. The introduction of the TPDS seems to 
have improved this and by 1999-00 the correlation between the poverty concentrations and 
income gains across states rose to 0.15.  
Finally, the impact of TPDS on poverty head count in 1999-00 though small in 
magnitude, has increased somewhat compared to the impact of universal PDS in 1986-87. 
Further, there is considerable variation in the poverty reducing impacts across states, with the 
four southern states and Orissa showing much larger impact than the national average. 
Nevertheless, even the highest impact is just 5.2% in Tamil Nadu.  
Underlying the above limited benefits flowing out of the PDS/TPDS to the poor are issues 
of targeting efficiency. Identifying the poor continues to be a challenging task in much of the 
developing world [Coady et al. 2002]. A major difficulty often is in identifying and 
addressing transient poverty, and in India this issue forms the basis for arguments for 
reverting from TPDS to universal PDS [MCA 2001; Swaminathan 2003]. Estimates by Dutta 
and Ramaswami (2001) using NSS data for the year 1993-94 show that targeting errors are 
large with substantial spatial variation. Strangely, however, they find that in general inclusion 
errors are smaller compared to exclusion errors (except in rural Andhra Pradesh), when in 
fact one would expect the converse to be true under universal PDS.  
The rising food subsidy bill has been a matter of concern to many. If the programs are 
efficient – that is, benefits reaches the intended beneficiaries – then an increase in the subsidy 
due to an expansion in the program and/or the magnitude of the transfer, may be justified. 
However, if the programs are inefficient/expensive in transferring benefits to the intended 
beneficiaries, then any increase in food subsidy would imply inefficient use of scarce public 
resources, which can have higher social returns in alternative investments.  
Dev et al. (2004) define cost-effectiveness as the public costs of transferring one Rupee 
worth of benefits to the beneficiaries and measure it as the ratio of total public expenditure on   9
a program to total income gains to the target group. Table 3 summarizes their estimates of the 
cost-effectiveness of alternative SSN programs.4 The cost of transferring one Rupee worth of 
benefits is found to be the lowest for the ICDS (1.44)5 followed by the EGS (1.85) and the 
JRY (2.28), while the PDS turns out to be the most expensive at 6.68. A similar conclusion 
was reached earlier by Radhakrishna et al. (1997) and Dutta and Ramaswami (2001).  
Three important messages emerge from the above analysis. First, compared to 1986-87 
when universal PDS prevailed, the access, income gains, poverty impacts and targeting 
efficiency of the TPDS in 1999-00 is better. This goes against the recommendations made in 
the Report of the High Level Committee on Long-term Grain Policy [MCA 2002b] for 
reverting back to universal PDS. Second, the targeting errors are large and vary substantially 
across states, implying that there is significant scope for further improvement. Finally, though 
somewhat dated, the estimates of overall cost-effectiveness indicate that self-targeted 
programs are more cost-effective than food subsidy programs.  
The self-targeted programs, such as EGS and ICDS, not only provide the poor with access 
to food but also contribute to overall development by building rural infrastructure and 
providing health and nutrition education, which help increase productivity and build a healthy 
labour force. Thus, a move in the future that lays increasing importance to self-targeting 
employment programs even while de-emphasizing the role of untargeted or administratively 
targeted food based SSNs such as the PDS/TPDS would be both welfare-improving as well as 
efficient. Besides, such a move will also reduce the need for government intervention in food 
markets for procuring, storing and supplying foodgrains to PDS and other such food based 
SSNs. This would enable the country to carry out reforms to the foodgrains policy regime and 
move away from parastatal-led price stabilization toward market-led price stabilization 
regime.  
4.4. Cost  Implications 
Recent trends in the costs of maintaining India’s “procurement-stocking-distribution” 
paradigm seem to echo some of the very problems that opponents of price stabilization 
policies had predicted through their theoretical models [Timmer 1996]. The system has 
become wastefully expensive, is dictated by special interests, has hindered development of 
private trade, and consequently imposed an increasing burden on society.  
As the degree of intervention increased, the size of the FCI’s workforce increased over 
the years, from 3,904 employees in 1965 to 70,000 in the 1990s. In 2004, FCI reported about 
55,000 regular employees and more than 170,000 casual workers. With increasing numbers 
rose the lobbying powers of FCI’s employees, as reflected in their ability to negotiate higher 
than market salaries/wages. The wage rates of FCI’s regular employees are 4-5 times higher 
                                                 
4  It may be noted here that the estimates by Dev et al (2004) for 1999-00 are close to those by Dutta and Ramaswami (2001) 
for Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh for the year 1993-94. Similar estimates for a recent year are not readily available.  
5  This by no means implies that the ICDS is successful in reducing malnourishment amongst children. Apprehensions on its 
effectiveness on that score have been aired by the Prime Minister himself [PMO 2007].    10
than market rates, while the daily wages of the casual workers’ are double that of rural 
labourers [Chand 2003]. In addition, the rents they derive from the system inflate their net 
income far above the value of their productivity.  
Public costs of the existing system have been increasing for years, but sent a wakeup call 
to the policy makers in 2002 when public foodgrains stock reached 63 million tons. During 
the three years 1999-2000 to 2002-03 food subsidy grew steeply at annual rates of 28, 45 and 
38 per cent, respectively. Share of subsidy allocated to public storage nearly tripled between 
1997-98 to 2001-02. Food subsidy as a percentage of gross domestic product has more than 
doubled over the last decade and half (Figure 4). The growth in food subsidy is all the more 
sharp considering that during this period the Indian economy has witnessed a high growth 
rate. Total food subsidy (at current prices) stood at about Rs.258 billions in 2004-05, which 
was equivalent to about one percent of national gross domestic product (GDP), 4.2 percent of 
agricultural GDP, 5.3 percent of the Central government’s total expenditure, and about 23 
percent of its capital expenditure.  
Underlying the rise in the food subsidy is the rapid rise in FCI’s total expenses as well as 
its per unit costs of procurement, distribution and storage operations (Table 4). The carrying 
cost of the buffer stock rose from 21 percent of the total value of the buffer stock in 1999-
2000 to nearly 75 percent in 2003-04. The central government spends more on holding buffer 
stocks than on agriculture, rural development and on irrigation and flood control taken 
together [MCA 2002b].  
Interest payments, freight expenditure and handling expenses constitute major items of 
FCI’s total expenditure, all of which have registered quantum increase in recent years. The 
share of interest payments rose to more than 40% in 2000-01 and 2001-02, before declining 
later on. The freight expenditure has increased due to increased grain movement in recent 
years.6 Expenditure on employee’s remuneration and benefits has increased due to the 
departmentalization of contractual labour in FCI depots.  
Apart from these direct costs, the current system imposes various forms of hidden costs 
on the society. The current system has created a large group of stakeholders – FCI’s staff, 
nearly half a million ration shops, about 225 million ration card holders, and more than 6,000 
state marketing and regulatory agencies (including mandi boards) directly involved with 
public intervention programs – who have a vested interest in maintaining the existing system 
with all its complex set of regulations. Many reports indicate that the politicians and farmers 
in the surplus states influence the MSP in India [Dev et al. 2004]. The vested interests are not 
hard to understand: higher support prices mean more secured markets for farmers, larger 
procurement for the FCI, and higher tax revenues for the politicians in the surplus states. 
                                                 
6  FCI undertakes grain movement keeping in mind the fresh procurement, stock, allocation and off-take levels. According 
to its recent Annual Report, the grain movement by FCI has increased from 29.72 million tons in 2003-04 to 33.92 million 
tons in 2004-05. Further, the grain movement on inter-state account has significantly increased as compared to the 
previous years.   11
Guaranteed markets make farmers, especially the larger ones, happy and the happier the 
farmers, the greater are the chances for politicians to get re-elected. The rapid rise in acreage 
under rice and wheat in the surplus states of Haryana, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh during 
1995/96-2000/01 well above that in the country as a whole is suggestive of the nexus 
between politicians and farmers [Rashid et al. 2005]. Such a price policy distorts the 
incentive structure in agriculture, and in fact slows down the natural process of diversification 
away from cereals to high value agriculture. 
Leakages and diversion of foodgrains from the PDS is another major hidden cost to the 
society. All available estimates, including those by the Government, as well as media reports 
[Rediff.com 2004] suggest that the leakage from the PDS is high. A recent study by M/s Tata 
Economic Consultancy Services cited in MCA (2002a) reports that, at the national level, 36 
percent of rice and 31 percent of wheat never reach the intended beneficiaries, and that the 
rate of leakage varies widely across states, from 17 percent in Andhra Pradesh to about 63 
percent in Assam. Even the Planning Commission’s estimates suggest that the leakage would 
fall within the range of 32-40 percent and 27-35 percent for wheat and rice, respectively (Dev 
et al. 2004).  
Inefficiency of the FCI in comparison to the private traders is another hidden cost to the 
society. Some recent studies conclude that despite enjoying various preferential treatments, 
FCI’s costs are higher than the private sector. Gulati and Kahkonen (1996) estimate that, 
while private traders earn 9-10 percent profits on sales, FCI losses as a percentage of sales 
were 29 percent and 68 percent in the case of rice and wheat, respectively. Similarly, Chand 
(2002) suggests that FCI’s per unit trading cost is twice as much as private traders in case of 
wheat and about 20 percent higher in case of rice. His estimates also suggest that, compared 
to private sector, FCI’s per unit storage costs are 30 percent higher; per unit labour costs are 
almost four times higher in case of rice and seven times in case of wheat; and interests 
payments are four times higher in case of rice and two and a half times in case of wheat due 
to longer storage periods. More strikingly, Jha and Srinivasan (2004) reports that not only 
have FCI’s unit cost been larger, the gap between the two has been widening. 
Proponents of the “procurement-stocking-distribution” paradigm argue that FCI’s costs 
are not comparable to those of the private sector because, unlike private traders, FCI has a 
social mandate, a large part of its costs are “policy determined” (e.g., procurement prices and 
distribution prices are centrally decided), and FCI has to transport its grain over long distance 
in order to reach the most remote parts of the country [MCA 2002b]. However, the facts do 
not support these claims. The system has not been successful in transferring income to the 
intended beneficiaries. “Policy determined” variables are found to be dictated by special 
interests, and some of the readily comparable FCI cost items have been larger than private 
sector.    12
5.  The Changed Context and the Need for Reforms  
Historically, lack of market integration due to inadequate infrastructure (roads, 
telecommunications, etc.), absence or inadequacy of risk-mitigating institutions, high 
volatility and thinness of the world grain markets, and foreign exchange constraints faced by 
the country, provided the broad rationale for public intervention in foodgrains markets 
[Rashid et al. 2005]. Today, however, the conditions both within and outside the country have 
changed so drastically that each of the above rationale are no longer valid. 
Infrastructure and information flow have improved dramatically since 1970. The paved 
road network quadrupled from 334,000 km in 1970 to 1,363 million km in 2000. In 1970, just 
one person in 370 had a telephone, one in 20,000 a television, and one in 32 a radio. By 2000, 
these figures rose to one in 5, one in 3, and one in 2, respectively [Rashid et al. 2005]. Mobile 
phone access has exploded even in rural areas. Improvement in transport and communication 
infrastructure has led to spatially more integrated markets since the mid-1980s [Palaskas and 
Harris-White 1993; Gosh 2003; Kumar and Sharma 2003]. With the widespread adoption of 
high-yielding varieties the argument that price supports are required to promote such varieties 
is no longer valid. World wheat and rice markets are now larger and more robust; 
international price volatility has become relatively small [Dawe 2004]. And India has 
accumulated large foreign exchange reserves (about $220 billion in August 2007) many times 
the amount needed to import any conceivable shortfall in supply. Under conditions in 2006-
07, ceteris paribus, buying all 30 million tons of rice available in the world market would 
have taken less than 5 percent of India’s foreign exchange reserves. This should encourage 
India to follow more liberal policies in foodgrain management, policies that dovetail 
international trade with domestic market reforms allowing greater role of private sector in an 
open economy environment. 
6. Reforming  Food  Policy 
The existing system of public intervention through the FCI bundles several operations as 
well as objectives. Operationally, the FCI (aided by several other state-level agencies) carries 
out procurement, storage, transport, and distribution of foodgrains. In each of these 
operations, the FCI and other state-level parastatal agencies have been observed to be 
inefficient. In terms of the objectives, the existing system seeks to cater to farmers’ interests 
(production incentives, and price risk protection) and simultaneously consumer interests 
(consumption subsidy, and price stabilization) using a single set of policy instruments.  
Given the conflicting goals of farmers (who want higher prices) and consumers (who 
want cheap food), meeting both their objectives is a delicate balance by itself. The 
uncertainties in predicting the swings in output and prices only complicate the matter further. 
By bundling both producer risk/income protection goals and consumer subsidy goals into the 
operations of the FCI, the government, faced with resource constraints, is often forced to 
compromise on one or other of its objectives. To improve the efficiency of the current system   13
of foodgrains management and to enhance the government’s capacity for meeting its 
distributional goals for welfare improvement, it is of critical importance to unbundle the 
operations of the FCI and to allow the private sector to compete at each level so that the 
overall costs are reduced.  
The key to successful reforms of the food management system is to decouple the 
government’s consumer welfare objectives from producer protection objectives, and 
particularly the MSP as protection against price risk should be decoupled from using it to 
augment farmer income. The government should not be in the business of determining farm 
incomes as the current system of MSP is attempting to, and should instead let the market 
determine the returns to various crops. The government should limit its role to stabilizing 
prices in order to promote food security of the poor. Price stabilization in a band bordered by 
the c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices can be pursued by a combination of variable tariffs, and through 
procurement and offload operations at market prices and by maintaining buffer stocks by the 
FCI. Only when there is a precipitous fall in prices below even the variable costs of 
production, a price support may be provided to farmers at a level that is just adequate to 
recover the variable input costs. The FCI’s procurement, storage and distribution operations 
should accordingly be scaled down. For the FCI to reduce its procurement operations, the 
demand on the PDS has to be reduced first by effectively targeting the subsidy to the needy. 
Eventually the current system of physical entitlements of grains under the PDS has to be 
replaced by a system of real income transfer that allows the beneficiary to purchase their food 
requirements from private retailers at the prevailing market price. Overall, the government 
needs to move away from the current highly interventionist policy regime, to one in which it 
concentrates on building the necessary infrastructure and institutions to make the market 
work.  
Accordingly: 
a)  The TPDS should be strengthened and it should cater only to the poor. Over time, the 
current system of consumption subsidy in the form of physical entitlements should be 
replaced by a system of food coupons that would allow the poor to purchase their food 
requirements from the market itself at prevailing market prices. These coupons could be 
periodically adjusted in line with price movements so as to offer a real income transfer. 
This would reduce the need for large scale public intervention in procuring, storing and 
distributing foodgrains, and enable downsizing the scale of public intervention in 
foodgrains markets. Eventually, employment-generation programmes and innovative 
income transfer programmes should replace consumption-subsidy programmes for the 
poor, since income transfers are welfare superior to commodity specific consumption 
subsidies.  
b)  Private marketing should be strengthened through reforming the Agricultural Produce 
Marketing Committees (APMC) Act, abolishing the Essential Commodities Act (ECA), 
abolishing rice levies, permitting direct purchases from farmers, eliminating movement   14
and storage controls, facilitating warehouse receipts, strengthening futures markets, and 
opening imports and exports to the private sector.  
c)  Private trade often relies upon futures market for hedging against price risks over time. A 
well designed public program of price stabilization too can look up to the futures markets 
for signals on where the supplies and prices are headed. Modern warehouse facilities, a 
system of quality certification and the transferability and negotiability of the warehouse 
receipts backed by legal provisions are critical to ensure that futures market function 
effectively. Legally backed negotiable warehouse receipts would enable farmers and 
traders to buy/sell grains, without the grains having to be physically moved around with 
every transaction. This would reduce transactions costs and hence the final cost to the 
consumer. Moreover, the negotiable warehouse receipts can in principle be used as 
collateral by farmers to raise credit. Further, this system by unbundling ownership and 
storage functions, can foster specialization in storage activity and help reap economies of 
scale and scope that reduce storage costs and losses. With ownership of grains and 
management of storage in different hands, this system can also help prevent large traders 
from getting a stranglehold on the market through uncompetitive trade practices. Besides 
the legal changes, there is also a need for a system of quality certification. This is a public 
good, which only the government is best equipped to put in place. 
d)  Complementary changes to the food pricing policies are required to ensure that the above 
enabling changes do result in greater private sector participation. Market prices should be 
stabilised based on transparent rules in an open economy environment (i.e., free of 
movement, storage and trade restrictions) somewhere within a band bordered by c.i.f. and 
f.o.b. prices by using a variable tariff policy (within the bound rates) consistent with 
WTO rules. To implement this policy, an agency that can track international prices and 
suggest changes in tariffs will be needed. It may be a good idea to convert Commission 
for Agricultural Costs and Prices to a Tariff Commission to do this job. Futures markets 
for grains are a useful institution that can give guidance about the future direction of 
change of the band itself; that is, whether there will be secular rise or fall in the band. It 
is, therefore, important to dovetail tariff-setting in line with the movements in the futures 
prices. Institutional arrangements for monitoring the price movements and carrying out 
tariff changes would have to be developed. 
e)  As long as the lower level of this band (including tariffs) remains above the A2 cost 
levels, all public procurement of foodgrains for safety net policy needs and/or for buffer 
stocks should be at market prices. Tendering should be used to move foodgrains from 
surplus to deficit areas. 
f)  The MSP should be set at A2/paid-out-cash-cost levels to mitigate farmers against the 
risk of precipitous fall in prices. It should become operational only when the lower level 
of the band, even after raising the tariffs to the maximum permissible bound rates, goes 
down below the A2 cost level. During such instances, government should invoke “special   15
safeguards mechanisms” to impose temporary quantitative restrictions on imports to 
eliminate arbitrage opportunities.7  
g)  The efficiency of FCI should be improved, in part, by making it compete with the private 
sector on a level playing field. Downsizing FCI should be effected in the current surplus 
states such as Punjab where FCI operations have ceased to bear any benefits and instead 
re-orient FCI operations to the eastern states where public support for market 
development is direly needed. Public procurement along lines described above for 
meeting the TPDS requirements, as well any buffer stock requirements, should be from 
the eastern states that have immense potential and cost advantages in rice cultivation.  
h)  Changes are also required on the operational side of procurement by the FCI. From a 
system of open-ended procurement at pre-announced procurement prices, the FCI has to 
move over to a system of tendering for the desired quantities and quality to be delivered 
at the desired location. For example, if grains are required in the state of Kerala for the 
TPDS, then the tender can specify that the grains be delivered in Kerala. Competitive bids 
have to be sought from private suppliers (domestic and foreign) and procurement will 
have to be at the lowest price. The market prices will thus not be distorted, and costs can 
be minimized.  
The above measures are a sort of integrated package and need to be implemented together 
so that dividends of such a package can be harnessed to the full in terms of better and targeted 
food security at a much lower cost. The resources so saved can be ploughed back to 
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Table 1 – Regulatory Support to Facilitate FCI’s Operations 
Regulations/Restrictions Origin  and 
Current status 
Enforcement Details 
I.  International Trade     
Export Monopoly / restrictions   
 Year  introduced.  1965 
  Still enforced?   Partially 
Adjustable quantitative ceiling (currently 0.10 
million tons) on export of wheat and coarse 
grains; strict licensing requirement for paddy 
export; and other grain exports are subject to 
registration of contracts.  
Import Monopoly/restrictions    
 Year  introduced.  1965 
  Still enforced?   Yes 
FCI retains full monopoly control over import 
of common paddy, fine variety rice, wheat, 
and coarse grain. Wheat import by roller 
flourmills is allowed under certain conditions. 
II. Movement  restriction    
  Year introduced  1941 (during 
British rule) 
  Still enforced?  Yes, partially 
Officially lifted in 1977, but has been 
enforced sporadically across India until 
recently. Now enforced in selected states  
III. Credit concession to FCI    
 Year  introduced?  1973-74 
 Still  enforced?  Yes, 
Interest rate was 7 % lower than market rates 
during 1972/73 – 1982/83, 5-6 % lower until 
mid-1990s, 2-3 % lower since 1997. 
IV. Restrictions on Trade Credit   




  Still enforced?   Yes 
Enforced at all India level; RBI restricts 
private traders access to credit by setting 
limits on working capital borrowing and 
interest rates.  
V. Preferential  transportation    
 Year  introduced.  1965 
 Still  enforced?  Yes 
FCI gets priority in railway transportation 
over private traders all over India 
VI. Restrictions on Storage    




  Still enforced?   Yes 
Imposes stock quantity limits. Lifted by the 
center, but frequently revised and sporadically 
enforced in recent years at the state level 
VII. Restrictions  on  processing     
  Year Introduced.  1958 under Rice 
Milling Industry 
Act 
 Still  enforced?  Yes 
Forces rice millers to deliver certain 
proportion of output (levy) to FCI at fixed 
processing margins; restricts open market 
sales until levy commitment is fulfilled. 
Enforced in most states.  
Source:  Rashid et al (2005). 
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Table 2 – Public procurement and distribution as percentage of production 
Period
1  Wheat Rice 
1967/68 4.04  8.99 
1973/74 20.10  7.69 
1976/77 15.42  11.17 
1982/83 17.13  13.14 
1985/86 20.45  15.07 
1988/89 16.46  13.27 
1995/96 19.70  15.50 
2001/02 24.60  21.55 
2002/03 28.9  26.5 
2003/04 21.9  23.5 
2004/05 24.5  28.9 
2005/06 21.3  29.5 
Notes: 1Triennium  Ending. 
Source: Dev  (forthcoming). 
 
Table 3 – Costs of income transfer in various social safety net programs, 1999-00. 
Programs  Total program 
costs (billion Rs.)
Cost of transferring 1 Rupee to the 
poor 
   Actual  If targeting was 
perfect 
Public Distribution Systems (PDS)*
  73.16 6.68  1.52 
Andhra Pradesh Rice Scheme (APRS)  10.63  6.46  1.59 
Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (public works)  1.18  2.28  -- 
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(EGS) 
 1.85  -- 
ICDS (Integrated Child Development 
Services) 
8.8 1.44  -- 
Notes: *
 Due to the unavailability of state level data, total spending on PDS represents only the subsidies by 
the central government. This implies that the estimates of income transfer costs would have been larger 
if the state subsidies had been added.  
Source:  Dev et al (2004).  
 
Table 4 – FCI's Expenses and Economic Costs (Current Prices) 
Years  Economic costs (Rs.per quintal) 











1981-82 7839.8 22.3  19.7 9.5 38.0  42.0
1984-85 12353.1 26.3  29.2 17.3 52.0  43.0
1989-90 15180.8 40.3  37.3 18.1 76.0  53.0
1994-95 40250.2 88.3  73.0 46.9 102.0  125.0
1999-00 61074.2 117.1  116.4 41.4 194.0  168.0
2003-04 93516.6 138.2  127.1 18.4 192.0  289.0
Source:  Annual reports of the FCI.    21














































Note:  BH: Bihar; GUJ: Gujarat; HP: Himachal Pradesh; HR: Haryana; PB: Punjab; MP: Madhya Pradesh; 
RAJ: Rajasthan; UP: Uttar Pradesh.  
Source:  MOF (2004) and MOA (2005).  
 
 



















































Note:  AP: Andhra Pradesh; AS: Assam; BH: Bihar; GUJ: Gujarat; HP: Himachal Pradesh; HR: Haryana; 
Kar: Karnataka; Ker: Kerala; MP: Madhya Pradesh; OR: Orissa; PB: Punjab; RAJ: Rajasthan; TN: 
Tamil Nadu; WB: West Bengal; UP: Uttar Pradesh.  
Source:  MOF (2004) and MOA (2005).  
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Notes:  For each financial year, stocks as on 1st of April, July, October, and January are shown.  
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of India.  
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Source: MOF (2006).  
 